THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN ISLAMIC BANKS by Ausat, Syed Amaar Ali
Jurnal Ekonomi & Studi Pembangunan 
Volume 19, Nomor 2, Oktober 2018, hlm. 91-100 
DOI: 10.18196/jesp.19.2.5001 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN ISLAMIC BANKS 
Syed Amaar Ali Ausat 
Department of Accountancy & Finance, School of Social Science,  
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
Correspondence E-mail: aausat@aol.com 
Received: June 2018; Accepted: October 2018 
Abstract: Corporate governance refers to policies and mechanisms related to how the company is 
directed and controlled and looks at the Board of Directors and their characteristics for example. The 
focus of this study will be to investigate the relationship of corporate governance and financial 
performance for Islamic Banks. The corporate governance variables and financial data was collected 
using the Orisis database and looking through annual reports of the banks from 2013 to 2017. The 
sample comprised 12 listed Islamic banks from different countries and used a panel data approach with 
a set of 60 firm-year observations. The corporate governance variables selected included, board size, 
CEO duality, board independence and Shariah Supervisory Board size to test their effect of a firm’s 
performance measured by ROA and ROE. Other firm level characteristics such as size and age of the 
banks were included to reduce the amount of external influence throughout the study. Results were 
analysed using descriptive statistics, Pearson Correlation Matrix, Generalised Least Squared (GLS) 
regression and the Random Effect Model. The concluding results proved that there was a positive 
relationship between some corporate governance variables and a firm’s performance. Board size was 
reported as the most significant factor which affects financial performance as measured by ROA. 
However, interestingly CEO duality was also noted to be a significant factor which affected 
performance. This was seen for both performance measures; ROA and ROE. The remaining 
independent variables and control variables showed no significant correlation to a firm’s performance 
and that there must be external factors which explain performance. The results showed that corporate 
governance was a necessary consideration for improved performance. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, Islamic Banking, GLS Regression 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has been a concern 
in developed and developing countries due to 
the onslaught of corporate scandals which have 
highlighted the importance of corporate 
governance practices on the global economy 
(Vaughn & Verstehen Ryan, 2006). Over the 
past few decades, many companies around the 
world, such as Enron, World Com and more 
recently, Carillion have suffered from failures 
in their corporate governance strategies from 
many problems relating to agency theory. The 
implications of maintaining good corporate 
governance has become an essential factor for 
improving a firm performance and encouraging 
economic development through the 
enhancement of investments (Price, Román, & 
Rountree, 2011). Failures in corporate 
governance have seen some of the largest 
companies around the world collapse, further 
highlighting its significance. 
As a result, many developed countries 
have established corporate governance rules 
and regulations that listed companies, in 
particular, must adhere to, in order to protect 
themselves and the public, for instance, the 
United Kingdom (UK) corporate Governance 
Code, (formally known as the Combined Code), 
published by the Financial Reporting Council in 
2003, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
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Governance Principles of 2002 (Otman, 2014). 
However, the principles outlined in these codes 
are largely derived from different 
recommendations by developed countries’ 
governments and may not necessarily apply to 
all countries (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Each 
country has a unique social and economic 
climate, meaning that certain rules and 
regulations that apply in one country, may not 
be as applicable in another. Similarly, each 
corporation is based on many differing factors, 
such as culture, religion, history and objectives 
and therefore corporate governance strategies 
should take this into account. This is especially 
relevant in the case of Islamic banks (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). 
Islamic Financial Institution (IFI) is a term 
used to describe the different types of 
institutions that comprise the Islamic financial 
industry which mainly consists of banks, 
accounting firms and finance companies. These 
companies’ activities are consistent with the 
Islamic rule of Law (Shariah Law) and are 
guided by principles of Islamic economics. The 
underlying principles of Shariah compliant 
finance is described by Samra (2016), as 
financing activities which include; the 
prohibition of interest (Riba) which translates to 
‘an unjustified increase’, prohibition of 
financing prohibited (haram) industries (e.g. 
sale of alcohol, pork bellies, tobacco), 
prohibition of excessive risk taking (Gharar) 
and the quest for a just and ethical society 
which includes the payment of obligatory 
charitable contributions (Zakat). A profit 
sharing concept is used within investing 
activities, where the return to investors is 
linked to profits of the activity, which is 
derived from risk. A ‘Sukuk’ is the most 
common form of investment and is similar to a 
bond and uses a profit sharing system. There 
are also other forms of investment including 
‘Ijara’ which is similar to a lease and is used as 
an alternative to mortgages for homeowners or 
leasing a car, for example (Samra, 2016). 
According to the Global Islamic Finance 
Report (2017), IFIs currently contribute over 
US$ 2.293 trillion to the global market and 
operate in over 75 countries which has seen 
growth of 7-10% annually in the last three 
years. This sector has provided consumers 
access to an alternative financing method that 
conforms to religious Islamic law or Shariah. 
Although certain practices differ with regards 
to IFIs, it should not be assumed that there is 
little need for corporate governance, just 
because the Islamic value system inherently 
protects the rights of stakeholders (Ahmed & 
Chapra, 2002). Over the years, Islamic banks 
have also seen major collapses due to corporate 
governance breaches, such as the demise of the 
Islamic Bank of South Africa in 1997 and the 
corporate fraud seen in the Dubai Islamic Bank 
in 2004. This provides a significant reminder 
that like conventional banks, Islamic banks 
require robust corporate governance systems. 
The following figure shows the 
progression of growth in Islamic Banks and 
Financial Institutions (IBFI) from 2007 and 2016 
worldwide, including future forecasts. 
 
Figure 1. Size and Growth of IBFI between 
2007 and 2016 with Future Growth Prospects 
Source: GIFR (2017)  
Given the continued growth of Islamic 
banking and the increase in corporate scandals, 
it is important to examine corporate governance 
mechanisms which contribute to improved 
performance and the continued success of the 
firm. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
Type and Data Sources 
The data types, employed throughout this 
research, include market and accounting based 
data. The data is exclusively secondary data, 
obtained primarily from annual reports, as well 
as from the Orisis database. The independent 
variables were obtained from annual reports of 
the Islamic banks and the dependent and 
control variables were obtained from the Orisis 
database. Orisis is a very practical and easy tool 
to use to gather company and financial data for 
companies worldwide, which was extremely 
beneficial. The annual reports were 
downloaded and examined to find the 
corporate governance information required 
regarding the companies. 
Data Samples dan Period 
The data sample chosen was based on 
public Islamic banks throughout the world. The 
Banks were ranked in terms of size of assets and 
the largest 12 banks were chosen. Selected firms 
were extrapolated from Orisis, but the choice of 
firms was dependent on availability of 
information. Companies, where annual reports 
were not available, were excluded, as many 
Islamic banks do not follow the same 
regulations as conventional banks and therefore 
often partial information only was available. 
Due to the nature of the Islamic banks, most 
banks were located in the Middle East and Asia. 
To ensure the reliability of the study, a 
long sample period was chosen. As the objective 
of this work was to explore the relationship 
between corporate governance variables and 
afirm’s performance, a longer time period 
allowed the identification of changes in 
corporate governance policies and 
characteristics that impacted the company’s 
performance. Conducting an analysis over a 
shorter period of time has drawbacks, as trends 
cannot always be seen, and looking at more 
historic data may not be relevant to the inner 
workings of the companies today. Therefore, a 
sample period of five years was selected where 
data was collected annually from 2013 to 2017.  
Consequently, due to lack of information 
of companies, a panel data set was developed 
for this paper which comprises 12 listed Islamic 
banks covering a period of 2013 to 2017. 
Therefore, the number of observations for this 
study establishes a panel data set of 60 firm-
year observations. 
The following formula explains the 
calculation of the number of observations: 
N x T = 12 x 5 = 60 Observations 
Where N represents the number of Islamic 
banks and T represents the number of years 
which is 5. 
Definition of Operational Variables 
The variables used in this study are 
separated into the independent, dependent, 
and control variables and will be explained and 
interpreted. To measure the independent 
variables which are the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, a number of methods 
will be used. The independent variables which 
are to be tested include; the size of the board 
(BSIZE), the ownership structure or CEO 
duality (DUAL), the board independence 
(NEDS) and the Shariah Supervisory Board size 
(SSBS). In order to measure the dependent 
variables which are the performance measures, 
two methods have been selected; return on 
asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In 
addition, the study will incorporate control 
variables to manage a firm’s characteristics that 
could influence or impact the performance of 
the company. The control variables chosen are 
the age of the firm (AGE) and the size of the 
firm measured in terms of size of assets 
(LSIZE). 
Data Analysis Technique 
1. Regression (GLS) 
A Generalised Least Squared (GLS) 
Regression Model is the primary technique 
used to examine the influence of variables on
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Table 1. Summary of Variables 
Variable Name 
Variable 
Category 
Symbol Definition 
Return on Asset Dependent ROA Net Income/ Total Assets 
Return on Equity Dependent ROE Net Income/Shareholder’s Equity 
Board Size Independent BSIZE 
The total number of directors on the 
board 
CEO Duality Independent DUAL 
Dummy variable is equivalent to ‘1’ if 
there is a dual role and ‘0’ if separate role 
Board Independence Independent NEDS 
The percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board 
Sharia Supervisory 
Board Size 
Independent SSBS 
The total number of members of the Sha-
ria Advisory Board 
Firm Age Control AGE 
The number of years of firm's existence 
since year of incorporation 
Firm Size Control LSIZE 
The natural logarithm of the size of total 
assets 
    
the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and a firm’s performance. GLS is 
used when there is a certain degree of 
correlation between variables or the variances 
of observations are unequal 
(heteroscedasticity). 
This means that the GLS regression is 
more suitable for this data, as it accounts for 
variables which are not in this model. GLS is 
used over Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) when 
errors in each time period are uncorrelated 
with variables in the current time period and 
by using OLS it might lead to misleading 
results. 
The GLS estimator is therefore used for the 
Random Effect Model which allows for 
tests related to cross sectional units (Gaur & 
Delios, 2006). 
A simple GLS regression with a single 
independent variable is shown below, 
which shows the linear relationship 
between the dependent variable (Y) and the 
independent variable (χ). 
Y = α + βχ 
The study incorporates a variety of 
independent variables and therefore the 
model can be extended to incorporate the 
rest of the variables being tested. 
Yi =  + 1χ + 2χ + 3χ + 4χ+ 5χ +   
       6χ  +i 
Where Y is the dependent variable; χ 
is the independent variable known as the 
repressor;  is the intercept which indicates 
the value of the independent variable when 
the dependent variable is equal to 0.  are 
the n coefficients for the χ, which show the 
change in Y that is associated with a unit 
change in χ, when controlling for other 
independent variables in the model; and  
is the error term. 
2. Panel Data Approach 
To further facilitate the reliability of 
the analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance, this paper will employ a 
panel data methodology. As explained by 
Gujarati (2003), in panel data, the cross-
sectional units (the firm) is surveyed over 
time. Therefore, panel data has space and 
time dimensions. Furthermore, an 
advantage of panel data, is that it accounts 
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for observable and unobservable facts, such 
as heterogeneity, which has not been 
included in some previous work (Dezso & 
Ross, 2012). Thus, the regression model will 
be adapted to include the effect of panel 
data: 
Yit =  + χit+ it 
3. Regression Model 
In order to test the hypotheses 
outlined, they will be tested against the 
following models: 
Performance =  +1 Board size + 2 CEO 
duality + 3 Board Independence + 4  
                                   Shariah Supervisory Board 
Size +5 Size of Asset+ 6Age +μ + 
ROA   =   + 1.BSIZEit + 2.DUALit + 
3.NEDSit + 4.SSBSit+ 
5.LSIZEit  + 6.AGEit+ μit+ εit 
ROE   =   + 1.BSIZEit + 2.DUALit + 
3.NEDSit + 4.SSBSit+ 
5.LSIZEit  + 6.AGEit+ μit+ εit 
Where: 
i = the firm number, ranging from 1-12 
t = the time period, ranging from 2013 – 
2017 
α = fixed variable (y-intercept) 
β1 – β4 = independent variables used and β1 
is the coefficient of the independent  
               variables 
β5 - β6 = coefficients of the control variables  
μ = unobservable random effect  
 = error term 
ROA and ROE represent the performance 
measure used which is the dependent 
variable. 
4. Panel Data Methodology (Random and 
Fixed Effect) 
Due to many past studies lacking 
variables and containing endogeneity 
problems, whereby the explanatory 
variable is correlated to the error term, 
fixed effect and random effect analysis will 
be undertaken. This is important when 
analysing panel data to achieve robust 
results for variables which have been 
omitted or not considered. 
 
The Hausman Test is used to 
differentiate between random effects and 
fixed effect estimates. The null hypothesis 
(H0) suggests that the Random Effect Model 
should be used, whereas the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) suggests that the fixed 
effect model is appropriate, and the 
Hausman Test can identify this. The 
Hausman Test also generates a chi-squared 
probability and if that value is greater than 
the significant value (5%) then the null 
hypothesis is accepted. As such the rule is 
shown below: 
If P > 0.05, then accept H0 (Use the Random 
Effect Model) 
If P < 0.05 then accept H1 (Use the Fixed 
Effect Model) 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
The table below (Table 2), provides the 
descriptive statistics generated by the 
econometric software Stata, of the research 
sample, which contains the number of 
observations, the sum of the variables, mean, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum 
values. The mean of the dependent variable 
ROA (%) is significantly lower than those 
found in Khan & Awan (2012) and Rambajan 
(2011) studies which are 8.2 and 11.7 
respectively. This is more in line with Haniffa 
and Hudaib’s (2006) work which found a mean 
ROA of 2.56. The ROE dependent variable is 
seen to have a larger mean of 18.92 which is in 
line with Hassan & Rizwans (2017) study and 
hada mean of 18.10, however it was much 
larger than Nomran et al. (2018) who reported 
a mean of 9.09. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Sum Mean SD Max Min 
ROE 60 1,135 18.92 14.04 58.12 -12.50 
ROA 60 118.9 1.982 1.053 4.880 -0.440 
LSIZE 60 1,000 16.67 1.182 18.33 14.66 
AGE 60 1,790 29.83 15.06 63 6 
BSIZE 59 579 9.814 1.786 14 7 
DUAL 59 6 0.102 0.305 1 0 
NEDS 52 3,976 76.47 13.87 100 44.40 
SSBS 60 268 4.467 1.214 8 3 
       
For the independent variable of board 
size, the mean is 9.8, suggesting that Islamic 
banks mainly have slightly larger numbers of 
members on the board, compared to Hannifa 
and Hudaib (2006) whose mean was 7.94 or 
8.08 for Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) and 7.96 as 
found by Mashayekhi & Bazaz (2008).  
This further demonstrates that Islamic 
banks tend to have a higher number of 
members on the boardcompared to other firms 
within Asian countries; this could be to 
broaden the pool of expertise. As for the 
independent variable of non-executive 
directors (%), the mean was observed to be 
76.47 which was again, a much larger 
proportion of NEDs compared to Hannifa and 
Hudaib (2006) who reported 58.53, Hermalin, S. 
and M. Weisbach (1991) who found a mean of 
55.90 and Mehran (1995) who saw a mean of 
55.00. It can therefore be established that 
Islamic banks also have a substantially higher 
percentage of NEDs on their board, which 
supports the idea of agency theory by reducing 
the conflict of interest that insider directors 
may have. 
For the independent variable of CEO 
duality, this study found that the mean was 
0.102 which was due to only two firms in the 
sample which had adual role. This was much 
lower than Belkhir (2009) who reported a mean 
of 0.55 but much higher than Daly & Frikha 
(2015) who saw a mean of 0, indicating that in 
their sample of Islamic banks, none of the 
banks had a dual role. Furthermore, for the 
independent variable of Shariah Board Size, the 
mean was 4.47 which was double, in 
comparison to what Hassan & Rizwan (2017) 
found, with a mean number of 2.09; however, it 
was inline with Nomran et al. (2018) which 
reported a mean number of members of 4.82. 
The control variable of age this paper’s 
sample obtained, wasa range of ages from 6-63 
years with a mean of 29.83. The sample of 
Islamic banks seen in Belkhir (2009) had a 
range of 2-53 with a mean age of 18.51. 
Similarly, Daly & Frikha (2015) reported a 
range of ages to be 1-33 and a mean of 15 years. 
This could therefore be a factor to explain some 
differences witnessed within this study 
compared to other papers, as the mean was 
higher; this could indicate a better performance 
due to longevity within the industry. 
Furthermore, the Log Islamic Bank Size had a 
mean of 16.67 which was just lower than 
Rashid & Jabeen’s (2016) study on which a 
mean size of 18.54 was noted, whereas Akhtar 
et al. (2011) had a mean of 6.67 as they used 
smaller banks for their sample which explains 
the variations. 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
The table below demonstrates the 
Pearson Correlation Matrix between all the 
variables included within this study.  
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix Results 
 ROE ROA LSIZE AGE BSIZE DUAL NEDS SSBS 
ROE 1        
ROA 0.691*** 1       
LSIZE 0.127 0.381** 1      
AGE -0.0545 0.328* 0.374** 1     
BSIZE 0.00235 0.161 -0.116 -0.293* 1    
DUAL 0.453*** 0.123 0.242 -0.252 -0.383** 1   
NEDS 0.177 0.179 0.439** -0.213 -0.0621 0.310* 1  
SSBS 0.174 0.409** 0.204 0.390** 0.112 0.168 -0.265 1 
         
 
The dependent variable ROE does not show 
much correlation to most variables however, it 
is highly correlated to ROA and CEO duality. It 
must be noted that since ROE and ROA will be 
used in different models, the models and the 
correlation between them will not influence the 
outcomes of this study. The lowest correlation 
is seen between ROE and age which means that 
age is a good variable to use as a control. ROA 
is also seen to be correlated to log size, Shariah 
Advisory Board size and age at the 5%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. Log size also shows a 
significant correlation to between variables of 
age, as well as NEDs at the 5% level and Board 
size and CEO duality also show a negative 
correlation at the 5% level. Age and BSIZE also 
see correlations that are negative which Rashid 
et al. (2010) also report and there is a similar 
significance between CEO duality and NEDs at 
the 10% level. 
Furthermore, since all the correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.95, there is no 
concern of collinearity between the variables 
and, as such all the independent variables can 
be used within the regression model (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009). 
The Hausman Test 
The Hausman test was conducted to 
check if the Fixed Effect or Random Effect 
Model was best used for the data. The 
Hausman Test results for the ROE model was 
0.85 and so the ROA model is 0.3374. Therefore, 
since the P value of the Hausman Tests are less 
than 5%, it means that the Random Effect 
Model is the most suitable to estimate the 
models. It can thereforebe said, that the effects 
of board size and CEO duality on firm 
performance provide robust results, however, 
none of the other independent or control 
variables have an impact on firm performance. 
Regression GLS Results 
The results of the GLS regression are 
shown in the table below for each dependent 
variable. The first column shows the 
relationship between the independent variables 
and firm performance as measured by ROE and 
the second column shows the relationship 
between the independent variable and ROA. 
From the first regression it can be seen 
that the P value of the F statistic is less than 0.05 
at the significance level, therefore, it can be said 
that all the independent variables 
simultaneously explain the dependent variable, 
which is ROA in this case.The R-squared value 
has been generated at 0.4333 which means that 
there is a 43.33% variation of ROA that can be 
explained by variation of all the independent 
variables in the model. This means that the 
remaining 56.67% is unexplained and therefore 
it must be due to unmeasured potential 
confounding variables that are outside of the 
model. 
As shown in the Random Effect Model, 
we can see that there is enough evidence at 
significance level of 5% for BSIZE to have a 
positive impact on ROA. This means that an 
increase of one board member is expected to 
increase ROA by an average of 0.155. 
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Table 4. GLS Estimate Results 
 Return on Equity (ROE) Return on Asset (ROA) 
Constant  
38.50 
0.83 
-0.14 
-0.631 
BSIZE 
0.96 
1.38 
0.15 
2.25 
DUAL 
21.41 
1.73 
0.97 
0.05 
NEDS 
0.21 
1.51 
0.13 
0.25 
SSBS 
0.105 
0.05 
0.10 
0.76 
LSIZE 
-4.04 
-1.15 
-0.14 
-0.48 
AGE 
0.22 
0.73 
0.03 
1.34 
R- Squared 0.3673 0.4333 
Number of Firms 12 12 
Observations 60 60 
  
Furthermore, any Islamic bank with CEO 
duality, is expected to have a higher ROA, by 
0.974 on average, than those that have a 
separate role at a significance level of 10%. As 
for the other independent variables and control 
variables, there is not enough evidence to 
suggest that the size of assets, age, NEDs and 
Shariah Advisory Board size impact the ROA at 
any significant level.  
From the second random effect GLS 
regression, it is shown that the P value of the F 
statistic is also less than 0.05 significance level 
and therefore,it can also be concluded that all 
the independent variables simultaneously 
explain the dependent variable.  The R-squared 
in this case is 0.3673 which means that 36.73% 
variation of ROE can be explained by a 
variation of all the independent variables in the 
model. 
This signifies that a further 63.27% is due 
to other factors or variables that are not 
included in the model. From the Random Effect 
Model related to ROE, it shows that there is 
enough evidence to suggest a relationship 
between CEO duality and ROE at a significance 
level of 10%. This means that any Islamic banks 
with CEO duality, are expected to have a 
higher ROE by 21.415 on average, compared to 
those with a separate role. The other 
independent variables and control variables do 
not see any significant relationship on a firm’s 
performance. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to investigate 
the relationship between corporate governance 
and Islamic bank performance. From the 
findings of the research obtained, it can be 
concluded that corporate governance is a 
fundamental factor which influences the 
functioning of Islamic banks by aligning the 
interests of shareholders and managers. Due to 
the different rules and regulations that Islamic 
banks are subject to, it is important to consider 
their various corporate governance policies. 
Some past studies have concluded that there 
are many different corporate governance 
variables which determine performance, whilst 
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others have found little significance and argue 
that a different set of variables influences a 
firm’s performance. 
The methodological approach followed 
shows correlations and regressions to assess the 
significance of the four independent variables 
on the two dependent variables. The study 
produced a variety of mixed results which is 
similar to previous work done within this field, 
however, some interesting observations were 
nevertheless obtained. The research findings 
demonstrated that board of director 
characteristics, such as board size and 
particularly leadership structure (CEO duality), 
have indeed impacted the performance of 
Islamic banks between the periods of 2013 and 
2017. Board size was seen to have the largest 
significance on performance measured by 
ROA, however, CEO/Chairman separation saw 
a significant relationship between ROA and 
ROE. However, from the random effect models 
it can be deduced that there are many more 
potential confounding factors which will also 
affect the performance of the Islamic banks. 
It can also be said that Islamic banks are 
not exempt from the effects of bad corporate 
governance; as stated in the beginning of the 
study, many Islamic banks have collapsed due 
to poor mechanisms. Moreover, different 
companies have different laws and approaches 
regarding corporate governance policies which 
could influence their perception of what 
measures are best for ensuring prolonged 
improved performance. 
Some limitations encountered through 
the course of this study relate to the availability 
of data and time constraints. The data collected, 
initially aimed to look at the top 20 banks 
within the Islamic banking industry 
worldwide, based on size of assets. However, 
due to different disclosure requirements and 
limited availability of data on databases, such 
as Orisis, the sample was reduced to 12 banks 
some of which were not the largest Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, as time was limited, this 
reduced the number of variables included and 
availability of data from more than five years 
ago, also raised issues. 
Upon completion of this study, further 
research could explore measuring performance 
using different variables, as well as expanding 
the sample and number of years looked at.  
This study could be expanded by increasing the 
sample size from 12 to 20, to expand the 
number of years looked atand to use larger, 
more established Islamic banks. As well as the 
variables included in this study, one could 
explore measuring performance using other 
corporate governance variables, such as Sharia 
Board Independence and Audit Committee 
independence. Moreover, further studies could 
consider the comparison between conventional 
and Islamic banking corporate governance 
variables to investigate which method has a 
larger effect on banking performance. 
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